Chapter 887 - Taiwan Island

For the refugees gathered from Zhejiang, the General Staff proposed establishing a transit point on Taiwan. The plan was straightforward: refugees would first be transported to camps on the island, held there for a period of quarantine and acclimatization, then shipped onward to Lingao. Some might remain permanently to develop the land, forming a second colony.

Taiwan's political situation, however, was rather more complicated. Multiple powers had carved out footholds along the coast: the Dutch held Tayouan in the south, the Spanish occupied Keelung in the north, and Zheng Zhilong controlled Beigang. Indigenous Formosans, Malay settlers, and Japanese traders also maintained small pockets of influence scattered across the island.

Yet the scale of these foreign presences remained remarkably modest. The Dutch, Spanish, and Zheng Zhilong each centered their power on one or two fortified strongpoints, controlling only the immediate surrounding territory. Beyond trade, they collected tribute from Fujian immigrants and indigenous peoples—though the latter contributed little. Apart from Zheng Zhilong's agricultural colonies, the Europeans viewed these outposts primarily as trading stations and collection points for local products, particularly the prized Taiwan deerskins.

Given the transmigrators' military strength, sweeping these forces from the island would prove trivially easy. Historical records painted a clear picture: the Spanish garrison at Keelung numbered fewer than ninety Europeans, supplemented by one or two hundred Filipino auxiliaries. In 1631-1632, the Dutch were still constructing Fort Zeelandia, their total European garrison not exceeding four hundred. Their effective control extended barely thirty kilometers beyond the castle walls. As recently as 1630, they had nearly been driven off by the Mattau tribe—only after the East India Company massively reinforced in 1635 did they begin punitive expeditions against surrounding indigenous villages to expand their territory.

The land threat from these forces was therefore negligible; one reinforced infantry battalion with light artillery could sweep the entire island. The situation at sea, however, demanded more delicate handling. The Dutch were current trade partners, and their naval presence in East Asia remained limited—they would not risk antagonizing the Senate with hostile action. The Spanish were barely a presence in Taiwanese waters.

The only real obstacle was Zheng Zhilong. The Fujian coast was his domain, and any naval convoy passing through those waters—or landing on Taiwan to establish a base—could hardly escape his notice. Should he choose to intervene, Operation Engine would face serious disruption.

For convoys merely transiting the Taiwan Strait, the threat remained manageable. Given the tonnage and firepower of the Harmony ships and their escorts, only a major fleet action by Zheng Zhilong could pose any danger. In the Navy's war games, the side playing Zheng Zhilong rarely managed to intercept the transport convoys. With the communication and navigation capabilities of the era, even if he wanted a fight, catching the right opportunity would prove difficult.

Establishing a permanent base on Taiwan was another matter entirely. Docking and anchoring meant regularly entering and departing coastal harbors, giving Zheng Zhilong ample opportunities for attack. This consideration could not be ignored.

Despite these concerns, everyone agreed a Taiwan base was essential—in terms of development potential, the island surpassed Hainan. The debate centered on location. Several sites were evaluated: Keelung, Tainan, Hualien, and Kaohsiung.

Keelung and Tamsui, held by the Spanish, were rejected first. Though the region boasted rich mineral deposits—the famous Keelung coal mines and Jinguashi gold-copper deposits—the development challenges were severe, the geographical conditions harsh. Any exploitation would require massive investment in manpower and infrastructure.

Contemporary accounts offered no praise for the area: "Keelung and Tamsui are not excellent anchorages; moreover, the nearby savages are fierce and cannot be dealt with." Another source was even more damning: "Haven't you heard of the evil water and soil of Keelung and Tamsui? People fall ill upon arrival, and illness leads to death. All servants hearing of assignment to Keelung or Tamsui sigh and lament as if sent to a land of death. Naval regulations rotate garrisons in spring and autumn, considering it fortunate merely to return alive. If even sturdy soldiers and servants fare thus, how could others survive?"

Both locations lay in northern Taiwan, the island's wettest region, with annual precipitation exceeding three thousand millimeters—Taipei experienced rain for half the year. Such excessive moisture favored plant and microbial growth but proved deadly to humans. Fujianese in the Ming and Qing dynasties called Taipei a land of miasma, and immigrant mortality rates ran appallingly high. Establishing a transit base there would mean accepting catastrophic losses.

Northern Taiwan would also suffer a major earthquake in 1694, powerful enough to create the thirty-square-kilometer Lake Taipei in the basin. By any measure, the Taipei region was no place for the transmigrators to establish themselves.

Hualien garnered considerable support. Its primary advantage was security. Located on Taiwan's eastern coast, separated from the rest of the island by mountain ranges, the surrounding terrain was precipitous. Most of the coastline could not accommodate landing ships; only river mouths offered suitable berthing. Controlling the river mouths would render the area virtually impregnable. Before the coastal road opened in 1932, Hualien remained connected to western Taiwan only by sea—a "land island." Throughout the seventeenth century, apart from a brief Spanish expedition to mine placer gold in 1622, no one showed interest in the place.

Hualien also possessed relatively rich mineral resources. Three types could be mined immediately: silicate serpentine asbestos, marble, and limestone. Even in the twenty-first century, Hualien remained Taiwan's most important cement production area. High-grade cement could be manufactured on-site to supply development projects across the island. Local iron ore deposits, though modest in scale, were easily accessible. Additionally, Hualien's serpentine formations were often associated with chromite, magnetite, and aluminum-magnesium deposits. The surface probably contained nearly everything except coal—ideal for small-scale development by a group like Lingao.

For freshwater, Hualien had three substantial rivers and considerable alluvial plains, offering genuine agricultural potential.

Yet ultimately, Hualien was eliminated for the same reason as the north: excessive rainfall. The climate remained unsuitable for large-scale immigration. During the Japanese occupation, plans to establish agricultural settlements in Hualien had failed due to disease and climate.

The final candidates were Pingtung and Kaohsiung in the south. This region on the Tainan Plain offered relatively hospitable conditions for habitation and agriculture. Kaohsiung possessed a natural harbor—though undredged and unable to accommodate large vessels, it could still berth sailing ships under a thousand tons.

To the south lay mountains; to the north, the Dutch sphere of influence. The Dutch currently maintained a commercial agreement with the Senate, a relationship of "peaceful" cooperation. They possessed neither the strength nor the inclination to risk offending a major trading partner by attacking the Pingtung-Kaohsiung base. Their presence would also serve to buffer against Zheng Zhilong. And given Zheng Zhilong's current preoccupation with internal conflicts along the Fujian coast, he would hardly have time to deal with the "Short-haired Thieves."

"We transport Zhejiang immigrants to Kaohsiung and Pingtung," Luo Duo argued at the conclusion of his presentation. "Not only do we gain a suitable location for quarantine and purification, but we can also begin agricultural development immediately. The Chianan Plain is Taiwan's finest agricultural region—sunlight, rainfall, and soil are all first-rate. We can implement intensive development through large-scale farming operations, far superior to the smallholder economy dominating Hainan. This represents a quantum leap for our agricultural production and will drastically reduce our dependence on grain imports."

"What if Zheng Zhilong moves against us?" someone objected. "His base is right in Fujian. He has official status—his power cannot be underestimated."

"We need not fear his fleet," Li Di of the Navy Staff responded. "By late 1631, after Refitted 854 and our first batch of Type 901s are complete, our fleet will be godlike in the Taiwan Strait. We forward-deploy the steam fleet to Kaohsiung for area escort of all shipping through the strait." He paused. "Currently, our Navy commands the seas from Hainan to Hong Kong. Stationing the steam fleet at Kaohsiung will deter any force along the Fujian and Zhejiang coasts from acting rashly—guaranteeing safe passage north to Jeju Island and south to Hong Kong."

The specific plan called for two detachments. The Taiwan Detachment, centered on Refitted 854 and four Type 901s, would be stationed at Kaohsiung, responsible for monitoring the Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong coasts. Their priority was ensuring freedom of navigation through the Taiwan Strait and escorting transport convoys. The Dengzhou-Lai Detachment, built around three Type 901s, would be based on Jeju Island, ready to execute intervention missions along the Shandong coast and into Bohai Bay.

In addition to the hybrid-powered warships, several refitted large-tonnage sailing warships would be incorporated into each detachment. The combined forces would employ a zonal escort system, with transport convoys sailing in formation, each vessel equipped with adequate self-defense armament.

These seven steam warships would operate in these waters until early 1633. By then, the second batch of Type 901s under construction at Lingao would enter service, allowing the first batch to rotate home for maintenance.

Both detachments would use Kaohsiung as their main base. The port facilities and stockpiles required to support hybrid steam-sail warships were far more complex than those for traditional sailing vessels. Ships heading north to collect refugees would therefore not sail with empty holds—the supplies needed for refugee transport, combined with the materials required to establish the Kaohsiung and Jeju Island sub-bases, would fill every available cargo space.